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I. INTRODUCTION 
Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure appears to be a 
model of simplicity and clarity. It reads, "A civil action is commenced 
by filing a complaint with the court." In defining "commencement" it 
also appears to provide guidance on how to begin an action which com-
plies with a statute of limitations. 1 Because of the decision in Walker v. 
Armco Steel Corp. ,2 that appearance is misleading in regard to state 
statutes of limitations applicable in federal court actions brought on the 
basis of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. In Walker the Supreme 
Court stated there is "no indication that ... Rule [3] was intended to 
toll a state statute of limitations, much less that it purported to displace 
state tolling rules for purposes of state statutes of limitations."3 The 
Court then proceeded to hold that the state commencement provision, 
requiring service of process, was to be applied to determine whether the 
action had been brought in time to comply with the state statute of 
limitations.4 The above-quoted statement from Walker makes refer-
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I. In Moore Co. v. Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co., 347 F.2d 921 (8th Cir. 1965), 
the court held filing alone was sufficient to commence an action within the four-year federal stat-
ute of limitations for private actions under the federal anti-trust laws. The court based its holding 
on Rule 3, which it viewed as "unmistakedly stat[ing] in plain, clear, well-understood and unam-
biguous language that an action is commenced by filing the complaint." ld at 922. The court 
also found justification for its holding in the fact that the statute of limitations was enacted subse-
quent to the effective date of Rule 3 and provided that actions would be barred unless "com-
menced" within four years. This, the court saw as further evidence that Congress intended to 
require only filing. Id at 925. Nowhere in the opinion does the court express any reservation as 
to its conclusion that Rule 3 speaks to commencement for the purposes of a statute of limitations. 
"If Congress or the rule makers had intended to impose [an additional requirement], it would 
have been a simple matter to include the condition by appropriate language in the rule or the 
statute." I d 
2. 446 u.s. 740 (1980). 
3. ld at 750-51. 
4. ld at 753. In the same term the Court held in a civil rights action brought in federal court 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979) that a state's tolling provision, as well as its statute of 
limitations, is to be applied unless inconsistent ,with federal policies underlying the cause of action. 
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ence only to state statutes of limitations, and the Court expressly 
avoided deciding the role of Rule 3 in regard to federal statutes of limi-
tations. 5 It is difficult, however, to perceive any basis in the language of 
Rule 3 or in the reasoning of the Court for concluding that the role of 
the Rule would change according to the nature of the authority enact-
ing the statute of limitations.6 
The decision in Walker does, however, provide a warning to plain-
tiffs bringing actions in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. 
They are told to bring those actions within the time provided by state 
statutes of limitations and to do so in accordance with state provisions 
defining commencement for limitations purposes, at least when those 
provisions constitute an "integral" part of the statute of limitations. 7 
The Walker decision was also not the first United States Supreme 
Court decision giving this same warning. In 1949 in Ragan v. Merchants 
Transfer & Warehouse Co. 8 the Court decided, in an almost identical 
fact situation, that the Erie doctrine required the application of a simi-
lar state commencement provision in a federal diversity action. Appli-
cation of the state rule was required because otherwise the outcome of 
the litigation would vary substantially from what it would have been 
had the action been brought in state court. Even though that holding 
was later brought into question,9 no reasonable person, having read 
See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980). Although at issue was the suspension of 
the running of the limitations period for the federal action during the pendency of a state court 
action, the Court concluded that the state tolling rule must apply to the federal action primarily 
because it was interrelated with the statute of limitations. /d. at 485-86. The Court in Walker 
viewed the state's commencement provision involved in that case as an "integral part" of its stat-
ute of limitations. 446 U.S. at 751-52. It seems clear, therefore, that had the Court in Tomanio 
been considering instead the applicability of this commencement provision, it would have re-
quired the application of this type of state rule also. 
5. Walker , 446 U.S. at 751 n.ll (1980). 
6. That is not to say filing alone cannot be sufficient if Congress, through the language of a 
particular federal statute of limitations, intended that to be the rule. See 347 F.2d at 925. 
7. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 751-52. One gap in the reasoning of the Court arises because in 
holding Rule 3 inapposite it does not consider whether any federal judge-made rule is or could be 
applicable. One explanation for this gap, perhaps, is that any judge-made rule that would have 
aided the plaintiff in that case would still have given way to the state rule under the doctrine of 
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Without consideration of a pertinent federal rule, the 
Erie analysis by the Court is rather summary. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 752-53. 
8. 337 u.s. 530 (1949). 
9. The continuing authority of Ragan became a matter of debate among the lower federal 
courts after the Court's decision in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). In Hanna the Supreme 
Court held that when a Federal Rule applied to a matter in issue even in the face of a conflicting 
state rule, the question was whether the Rule was a valid exercise of the rulemaking power under 
the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). /d. at 471-74. In this situation the Erie doctrine 
simply did not constitute the appropriate test. /d. at 469-70. · 
The issue arose because Ragan's refusal to apply Rule 3 in the face of a conflicting state rule 
was on the basis of Erie, but the Court in Hanna distinguished Ragan as a case in which the scope 
of the Federal Rule was simply not as broad as the plaintiff had urged. /d. at 470 & n.l2. This 
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that case, could thereafter feel safe in relying on Rule 3 as the control-
ling commencement provision in diversity cases. Yet, since 1949, 
ninety-one federal decisions in diversity cases have been reported in 
which Rule 3's application as the controlling commencement rule for a 
state statute of limitations has been in issue. 10 Although "tip of the 
iceberg" arguments can be carried too far, it does not seem unreasona-
ble to suggest that the misreading of Rule 3 as a commencement provi-
sion has played a part in a number of cases that were settled because 
plaintiff learned of the probable insufficiency of filing for limitations 
purposes. 
Knowing that state commencement provisions might apply in fed-
eral diversity actions does not solve the problem of finding the applica-
ble state provision. In diversity actions federal courts must apply the 
choice of law or conflict of laws rule of the forum state. 11 To find 
which state will supply the applicable statute of limitations, therefore, 
requires application of the conflict of laws rules and principles estab-
lished by the forum state. 12 Even when the law of the forum will sup-
ply the applicable commencement provision, some care is required 
since that state may have two provisions which appear to control com-
mencement of a suit. In Walker the Court noted that the state had a 
distinction requires a strained interpretation of the basis of decision given in Ragan or at least 
some degree of rather enlightened hindsight. Compare Smith v. Peters, 482 F.2d 799, 801-02 (6th 
Cir. 1973) (compliance with Rule 3 commences suit for state limitations purposes), cert. denied, 
415 U.S. 989 (1974) and Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598, 604-06 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(compliance with Rule 3 commences suit for state limitations purposes) with Groninger v. 
Davison, 364 F.2d 638, 642 (8th Cir. 1966) (state commencement provision rather than Rule 3 
controls for state limitations purposes). 
10. See Appendix to this article. Justice Douglas alluded to one reason for the continuing 
and frequent failure to act in accordance with the warning provided by Supreme Court decisions 
when he said, ' 'Those who read this opinion may have adequate warning. But this opinion, like 
most, will become an obscure one-little known to the Bar." England v. Louisiana State Bd., 375 
U.S. 411 , 435 (1964) (concurring opinion). One might add that here, as opposed to issues involv-
ing abstention, there is a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that appears clearly to provide guidance 
so that the usual tendency of a litigant to research judicial decisions is weakened. 
I I. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). 
12. When a choice of law rule of a state would require the application of the law of another 
state, only the substantive law of that state is to be applied-the procedural law of the forum 
remains applicable. SeeR. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 49 (2d ed. 
1980). Statutes of limitations, although generally considered procedural for choice of law pur-
poses, are considered substantive when they are built into or contain specific reference to the 
particular cause of action. These general rules are superseded, however, when the forum state has 
promulgated a "borrowing" statute which directs application of statutes of limitations under 
stated circumstances. See generally id. at 59-67. Borrowing statutes, when they direct the applica-
tion of another state's limitation period, will frequently require application be done under the 
"laws" of that state, including laws regulating tolling and other related provisions. See Speight v. 
Miller, 437 F .2d 781 , 782-83 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 827 (1971); Vernon, Statutes of 
Limitation in the Conflict of Laws: Borrowing Statutes, 32 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 287, 307-10 
(1960). 
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general rule of procedure stating that an action is commenced by filing 
plus the issuance of summons, but this was not the rule applicable to 
commencement for limitations purposes. The applicable provision re-
quired, in addition, service of process within the limitations period or, 
in the alternative, an attempt to serve within that period plus actual 
service within sixty days thereafter. 13 The plaintiffwas thus required to 
know that neither Rule 3 nor the general state provision meant what it 
appeared to mean. 14 
Failure to comply with a statute of limitations, unlike most proce-
dural missteps in federal court, terminates the plaintiffs claim and does 
so for reasons having no direct relation to the justness of that claim on 
the merits. If the failure to comply with state commencement require-
ments can be proved a result of the negligence of plaintiffs lawyer, then 
perhaps plaintiff can replace his former cause of action with one for 
malpractice. 15 Even if this is so, the defendant, the one who allegedly 
caused harm to the plaintiff, may escape liability because of what may 
be nothing more than a technicality. 16 The Federal Rules generally 
reflect a rejection of the attitude that procedure is a game wherein the 
unwary can lose all. As Justice Black has written: 
These rules were designed in large part to get away from some of the 
old procedural booby traps which common-law pleaders could set to 
prevent unsophisticated litigants from ever having their day in court. 
If rules of procedure work as they should in an honest and fair judi-
cial system, they not only permit, but should as nearly as possible 
guarantee that bona fide complaints be carried to an adjudication on 
the merits. 17 
Likewise, when a rule of procedure misleads or hides more than it tells 
as to matters other than pleading, which have the potential for depriv-
13. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 740 & n.l3. 
14. The court of appeals viewed the state provision providing for commencement for limita-
tions purposes as "complex and even mysterious" and ' 'technical and cumbersome" but felt com-
pelled to apply it. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 592 F.2d 1133, 1135 (lOth Cir. 1979). 
15. See e.g., Wilcox v. Plumer, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 172, 183 (1830) (limitations expired before 
filing); Hillhouse v. McDowell, 219 Tenn. 362, 371, 410 S.W.2d 162, 166 (1966) (attorney liable for 
failure to bring action within limitations period); House v. Maddox, 46 Ill. App. 3d 68, 73, 360 
N.E.2d 580, 584 (1st Dist. 1977) (legal malpractice for attorney to fail to file within limitations 
period); Fuschetti v. Bierman, 128 N.J. Super, 290, 294-95, 319 A.2d 781, 784 (1974) (failure to 
bring action within limitations period as evidence of neglect). If a legal technicality causes the 
running of a limitations period, the lawyer may not be liable for malpractice. See In re Watts, 190 
U.S. I, 32 (1903) (innocent error not considered negligence). 
16. The characterization of the limitations defense as a technicality is further explained in the 
body of this article. In short, this characterization is legitimate when the defendant had full 
knowledge of the filing of the action within the limitations period but is saved by formal or techni-
cal requirements not satisfied by the plaintiff. 
17. Sutowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966). 
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ing an unsophisticated or excusably-erring litigant of his day in court, it 
should be ~hanged. 
It is my contention that because Rule 3 provides litigants with in-
accurate information pertaining to a crucial step in the process of adju-
dication it should be amended. A proposed amendment is, therefore, 
presented and discussed in the latter part of this article. Deciding that 
a Rule should be amended does not of course answer the question of 
how it should be amended. When the deceptive appearance of simplic-· 
ity fostered by Rule 3 is peeled away one discovers a clutter of trouble-
some constitutional, statutory, and federalism problems that cannot be 
easily swept aside. They must be considered before a proposal can be 
formulated primarily because they most assuredly will be considered 
by the authorities responsible for promulgating and approving such a 
proposal as a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. The body of this article 
is therefore dedicated to that task. First, however, it is necessary to 
clarify the legal terminology used in relation to statutes of limitations 
because the meaning of various of these terms is none too clear and 
because, after all, this article is more than just tangentially concerned 
with the meaning of legal words. 
II. LIMITATIONS TERMINOLOGY 
Statutes of limitations fix time limits within which designated 
claims must be commenced. 18 Typically, the fixed period established 
by a statute of limitations is computed from the date on which the 
claim for relief arose or accrued, which would ordinarily be the date on 
which occurred the last event necessary to permit the bringing of an 
action in court to assert that claim. 19 To comply with the command of 
a statute of limitations, plaintiff must initiate or commence an action on 
his claim within the prescribed period or it will be barred.2° In addi-
tion, a particular jurisdiction may provide for postponement of the be-
ginning of a limitations period or for suspension of the running of the 
period under certain circumstances. For example, a person may not 
discover that his injuries are the result of a negligent act until long after 
18. See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 
(1944); Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879). ''The lapse of years without any attempt to 
enforce a demand creates .. . a presumption against its original validity, or that it has ceased to 
subsist." Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386, 390 (1868). 
19. See generally J)evelopments in the Law-Statutes o/ Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177, 
1200-20 (1950) [hereinafter cited as J)evelopments] . 
20. See A.J. Phillips Co. v. Grand Trunk Ry., 236 U.S. 662, 667 (1915). "Under such a statute 
the lapse of time not only bars the remedy but destroys the liability .... " Jd at 667. See also 
Kansas City S. Ry. v. Wolf, 261 U.S. 133, 140 (1923); Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451 , 457 (1904). See 
generally Special Project, Time Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal Rights of Action 
and State Statutes o/ Limitations, 65 CoRNELL L. REv. 1011, 1016-18 (1980). 
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that act has occurred; and, technically, once a negligent act has caused 
damage, a claim sufficient to allow suit arises. Under these circum-
stances some jurisdictions provide that the applicable statute of limita-
tions will begin to run from the time plaintiff discovered or should have 
known that he was harmed by the negligence of defendant rather than 
from the time the negligence occurred. 21 The running of a limitations 
period may also be suspended for the period during which a defendant 
is outside the jurisdiction of the state.22 
If an action is properly commenced within the limitations period, 
there may be further limitations problems raised by an amendment to 
the plaintifi's pleading that changes the cause of action or the parties. 
This question, in terms used by Rule 15(c) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, is whether the amended complaint "relates back" to the 
date on which the action was brought under the original complaint.23 
An action commenced in compliance with the applicable statute of lim-
itations may also fail for procedural or jurisdictional reasons either 
before or after the expiration of the limitations period. If it fails before 
the end of that period and plaintiff fails to recommence the action 
before the period expires, plaintiff may be able to successfully argue 
that the limitations period was suspended during the pendency of the 
first suit. If the original action is dismissed after the limitations period 
has expired, either suspension or a "savings" statute (allowing recom-
mencement within a specified period) may preserve plaintiffs claim.24 
"Tolling" is the term used generally to characterize rules that pro-
vide an exception to the mechanical calculation and application of a 
21. See, e.g. , White v. Schnoebelen, 19 N.H. 273,275-76, 18 A.2d 185, 186-87 (1949) (period 
co=ences when lightning causes damage, not when lightning rod negligently installed); Cardin 
v. McClellan, 85 S.W. 267, 272-73 (Tenn. 1905) (period calculated from time vendee deprived of 
property, not from time of negligent filing of deed); Theurer v. Condon, 34 Wash. 2d 448, 455, 209 
P.2d 311, 315 (1949) (period measured from time of fire, rather than time of negligent installation 
of fuel tank). Contra Powers v. Planters Nat'! Bank & Trust Co., 219 N.C. 254,256, 13 S.E.2d 431, 
432 (1941) (period co=ences when agent fails to disclose that premises are contaminated, not 
when lessee contracts tuberculosis). 
22. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2416(a) (1976) (all periods excluded during which defendant or res 
is outside the United States); Partis v. Miller Equip. Co., 324 F. Supp. 898, 900 (N.D. Ohio 1970) 
(savings statute tolls limitation period during defendant's absence); Byrne v. Ogle, 488 P.2d 716, 
717-18 (Alaska 1971) (purpose of statute to prevent plaintiff from being deprived of opportunity to 
assert claim). 
23. See Bemis Bros. Bag Co. v. United States, 289 U.S. 28, 35 (1933). See generally Note, 
Civil Procedure-The Erie Doctrine and Relation Back of Supplemental Pleadings Under Rule 
15(c)-Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 621 , 633-36 (1980). The test of 
whether amendment relates back, for limitation purposes, is notice; and inquiry should focus on 
notice given by general fact situation as set forth in original pleading. See also Rosenberg v. 
Martin, 478 F.2d 520, 526 (2d Cir. 1973); Oil Well Supply Co. v. First Nat'! Bank, 106 F.2d 399, 
404 (lOth Cir. 1939). 
24. See Developments, supra note 19, at 1243-44. 
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limitations period, including rules regulating the actions necessary to 
commence a suit in compliance with a statute of limitations.25 "Com-
mencement," however, seems a more precise term for discussing these 
steps,26 although its use may lead to some confusion since the Supreme 
Court's decision in Walker .27 Even so, "commencement" is more likely 
than "tolling" to maintain a focus on the particular matters discussed in 
this article and has been generally understood to refer to the steps nec-
essary for compliance with the command of a statute of limitations. 28 
It is also less cumbersome than some of the alternatives in that it can be 
more easily and effectively used as both a noun and an adjective. 
Ill. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON 
CONGRESS'S ENACTMENT OF PROCEDURAL RULES FOR 
FEDERAL COURTS 
In Hanna v. Plumer,29 the Supreme Court held in a federal court 
case based on diversity jurisdiction that Rule 4(d)(l)30 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure was valid and controlling in the face of a con-
flicting state rule. Plaintiff in Hanna had complied with Rule 4(d)(l) 
by leaving copies of the summons and the complaint with defendant's 
wife at his residence, but the state rule required delivery in hand to an 
executor of an estate, which was the capacity in which defendant was 
sued. Defendant argued that to disregard the state rule would cause a 
substantial variance in the outcome of this litigation from what it 
would have been if brought in state court and that, therefore, under the 
rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins/ 1 as refined in Guaranty Trust Co. v. 
25. For example, in order to ensure an adequate remedy to an aggrieved person without the 
hardship of being forced to travel to a foreign jurisdiction to enforce his claim, the prescribed 
limitation period would run from the time that the alleged wrongdoer became subject to the juris-
diction of the forum state. See Chemung Canal Bank v. Lowery, 93 U.S. 72, 77 (1876). See 
generally Note, Federal Rule 3 and the Tolling of Stale Statutes of Limitations in Diversity Cases, 20 
STAN. L. REv. 1281 (1968). 
26. Commencement defines the activity that more or less permanently tolls the statute of 
limitations. For a discussion of what constitutes "commencement" in various jurisdictions, see 
Developments, supra note 19, at 1237-44. 
27. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 750. 
28. See 347 F.2d at 922. 
29. 380 u.s. 460, 473-74 (1965). 
30. FED. R. C1v. P. 4(d)(l) provides that service may be made: 
Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person, by delivering a copy 
of the summons and of the complaint to him personally or by leaving copies thereof at 
his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discre-
tion then residing therein or by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint 
to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process. 
31. 304 u.s. 64, 78 (1938). 
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York,32 the state rule must be applied.33 The Supreme Court in Hanna 
responded with the observation that Erie had never been invoked to 
void a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure,34 distinguishing Ragan v. 
Merchants Transfer Co. 35 as a decision in which Rule 3 was held not to 
apply to the matter to be decided. 36 
In Hanna the Court held that Erie was not the appropriate author-
ity for determining the validity of a Federal Rule because that case 
concerned the applicability of federal rules of general common law that 
were not authorized by any grant of federal authority in the Constitu-
tion.37 Erie did not involve a Federal Rule but rather dealt with a 
question which was clearly "substantive."38 In Hanna the question in-
volved a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure promulgated pursuant to the 
Rules Enabling Act and Congress has constitutional authority to pro-
vide rules of practice and procedure for lower federal courts. 39 
Both article I and article III of the Constitution grant Congress 
power to create federal courts inferior to the Supreme Court.40 In addi-
tion, the Necessary and Proper Clause of article I supports Congress's 
power to enact laws appropriate for carrying into execution these spe-
cific delegated powers.41 The power to create lower federal courts 
therefore is augmented by the power to make rules controlling the pro-
cedural operation of those courts. The scope of these powers is not 
limited by reference to state powers except in the sense that only state 
power exists beyond the constitutional reach of Congress.42 Therefore, 
32. 326 u.s. 99, 109-10 (1945). 
33. 380 U.S. at 466: 
Reduced to essentials, the argument is: 
(I) Erie, as refined in York, demands that federal courts apply state law whenever ap-
plication of federal law in its stead will alter the outcome of the case. 
(2) In this case, a determination that the Massachusetts service requirements obtain 
will result in immediate victory for respondent. If, on the other hand, it should be held 
that Rule 4(d)(l) is applicable, the litigation will continue, with possible victory for 
petitioner. 
(3) Therefore, Erie demands application of the Massachusetts rule. 
34. Id at 470. 
35. 337 u.s. 530 (1949). 
36. In Ragan, the Supreme Court held that the state rules of procedure controlled. 
But the holding of each such case was not that Erie commanded displacement of a Fed-
eral Rule by an inconsistent state rule, but rather that the scope of the Federal Rule was 
not as broad as the losing party urged, and therefore, there being no Federal Rule which 
covered the point in dispute, Erie commanded the enforcement of state law. 
380 U.S. at 470. 
37. The Court in Erie held that no federal general common law can exist because no provi-
sion in the Constitution authorizes either Congress or the federal courts to "declare substantive 
rules of common law applicable in a State." 304 U.S. at 78. 
38. 380 U.S. at 472. 
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). 
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; U.S. CONST. art. III, § I. 
41. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-23 (1819). 
42. The tenth amendment does not carve out any protected enclave of state powers. It simply 
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the fact that one of the Federal Rules conflicts with a state rule, even to 
the extent that its applicability substantially varies the outcome of liti-
gation as between federal and state courts, does not make the Rule con-
stitutionally invalid.43 The constitutionality of a Federal Rule simply 
does not tum on a substantive-procedural distinction.44 The Necessary 
and Proper Clause would be insufficiently elastic to support a Rule that 
was clearly not procedural.45 Such a Rule would be challenged, how-
ever, as being beyond the need for efficient operation of a national 
court system in that it . was not sufficiently related to the oiling of the 
mechanical process of adjudication.46 In the conclusory sense only 
would it be substantive, assuming any law which is not procedural 
must necessarily be substantive. 
The difficulty in determining the scope of congressional power by 
reference to a substantive-procedural distinction is that no clear, easily-
applied test exists for making this distinction. 47 Congress cannot 
achieve its purposes in providing uniform rules of procedure48 if those 
rules are vulnerable to frequent constitutional challenge on the basis of 
such an amorphous distinction. In recognizing this danger, the Court 
in Hanna held that Congress's power included the power to regulate 
matters "which, though falling within the uncertain area between sub-
stance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as ei-
ther."49 Justice Harlan, concurring in Hanna, accurately characterized 
this as an "arguably procedural, ergo constitutional" test, which he 
contended went too far. 50 Although Congress could conceivably abuse 
makes explicit that which was implicit in the Constitution of 1787--powers not delegated to fed-
eral government are left to the states. See Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 
693,701-04 (1974). The tenth amendment does, however, protect certain traditional powers of the 
state: "Congress may not exercise [the commerce] power so as to force directly upon the States its 
choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions are 
to be made." National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976). Before a federal 
statute violates this prohibition, it must satisfy each of three requirements: (I) regulate state gov-
ernment institutions directly ("States as States"); (2) address matters indisputably "attributes of 
state sovereignty," and (3) directly impair the state's ability "to structure integral operations in 
areas of traditional functions." Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352, 
2366 (1981). Regulation of federal procedure clearly fails to satisfy the first requirement. 
43. See 380 U.S. at 472: "Neither York nor the cases following it ever suggested that the rule 
there laid down for coping with situations where no Federal Rule applies is coextensive with the 
limitation on Congress to which Erie had adverted." 
44. See Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 497 F. Supp. I 105, 1123 (E.D. Ky. 1980). 
45. See id. at 1123 n.98. 
46. See id. 
47. Erie makes no clear-cut distinction between substance and process. See 304 U.S. at 74. 
York stands for the proposition that the outcome should be substantially the same if tried in a 
federal court as it would have been had the case been tried in state court. See 326 U.S. at 107-10. 
48. See Sunderland, The Grant of Rule-Making Power to the Supreme Court of the United 
States, 32 MICH. L. REv. Jll6, ll24 (1934). 
49. 380 U.S. at 472. 
50. See id. at 476. 
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its powers by using procedure as a pretext, 51 that possibility is not a 
reason for denying it ample means by which to provide for the efficient 
operation of the federal court system or for requiring dependence on 
the states for these purposes. 52 The rationality test established by 
Hanna (or the arguably procedural test) provides Congress ample lee-
way under the Constitution to establish procedural rules even though 
those rules may supplant arguably substantive state rules on occasion. 53 
Whether Congress, in enacting the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,54 
meant to exercise its full constitutional power, however, is another 
question. 
A. Ely's Interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act 
Although the struggle for procedural reform in the federal courts 
leading to the Enabling Act began as early as 1911 55 it was stalled by 
opposition which feared, in part, that federal rules would impose a 
more complicated system of procedure than that developed in some 
states.56 When the bill that became law was introduced, however, its 
passage was surprisingly rapid and without substantial opposition. 57 
51. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423: 
Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are prohibited by 
the constitution; or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws 
for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would become the 
painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to 
say that such an act was not the law of the land. But where the law is not prohibited, and 
is really calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the government, to undertake 
here to inquire into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which circum-
scribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground. · 
52. See id. at 424: 
No trace is to be found in the constitution of an intention to create a dependence of the 
government of the Union on those of the States, for the execution of the great powers 
assigned to it. Its means are adequate to its ends; and on those means alone was it 
expected to rely for the accomplishment of its ends. To impose on it the necessity of 
resorting to means which it cannot control, which another $overnment may furnish or 
withhold, would render its course precarious, the result of Its measures uncertain, and 
create a dependence on other governments, which might disappoint its most important 
designs, and is incompatible with the language of the constitution. 
53. The scope of this power is not thereby unlike the scope of the commerce power which 
allows intrusion on state powers over "local" matters. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. I, 79-30 (1937). 
54. 28 u.s.c. § 2072 (1976). 
55. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1003, at 40 
(1971). 
56. See id. at 41. 
57. "The actual enactment of the bill was astonishingly casual ... . The discussion in the 
two houses consumed only a few minutes each." Attorney General Homer S. Cummings had sent 
a letter to the judicial committees of each House recommending the bill so as to bring about 
"uniformity and simplicity in the practice in actions at law in Federal courts and thus relieve the 
courts and the bar of controversies and difficulties which are continually arising wholly apart from 
the merits of the litigation in which they are interested." P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. 
WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 673-74 
(1973); see 78 CONG. REC. 9362-63 (1934); 78 CONG. REc. 10,866 (1934). 
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The Enabling Act delegates power to the Supreme Court to prescribe 
by general rules the practice and procedure of the lower federal 
courts.58 Under the Act these rules cannot _come into effect until the 
expiration of ninety days after they have been reported to Congress by 
the Chief Justice. The second sentence of the Act, in its present form, 
states that these rules "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any sub-
stantive right."59 The original Act, prior to its revision in 1948, had 
included the phrase "of any litigant" following "substantive right."60 
Professor John Hart Ely has argued that the second sentence im-
poses a substantive-procedural distinction not found in the constitution 
which, unless it is to be rendered meaningless,61 must be seen as evi-
dence that Congress intended to limit the scope of the power delegated 
to the Supreme Court.62 This substantive-procedural distinction, how-
ever, is not to be determined under the Erie- York analysis, but rather 
under an analysis of the scope of the constitutional and statutory au-
thority to prescribe Federal Rules, 63 as the Court recognized in Hanna. 
The Enabling Act was clearly intended to be the authority for a set of 
rules to be applied in federal courts regardless of the basis of subject 
matter jurisdiction. If the Erie test were applied to the Federal Rules, 
this intent would be substantially frustrated since the application of 
many of the Rules in lieu of contrary state rules would be outcome 
determinative. 64 
Professor Ely's reasoning proceeds as follows: (1) the Constitu-
tion imposes no "substantive" restriction on Congress's rulemaking 
power and would allow modification of substantive rights to some ex-
tent; (2) the Enabling Act in imposing such a restriction on the Federal 
Rules therefore evidences Congress's intent to exercise less than all of 
its constitutional rulemaking power; and (3) this limitation in the En-
abling Act was not meant to be defined by reference to the Rules of 
Decision Act as interpreted in Erie and its progeny. To further support 
step three, Professor Ely points out that once the constitutional basis for 
the Enabling Act is established, that Act stands as the more recent stat-
ute and, therefore, is controlling as to inconsistencies between it and 
the Rules of Decision Act, which is the statutory basis of Erie. More-
58. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 
(1976)). 
59. 28 u.s.c. § 2072 (1976). 
60. Act of June 19, 1934 Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 
(1976)). 
61. See Ely, supra note 42, at 724 n.l71. 
62. See Ely supra note 42, at 718-19. The act imposes the enclave theory restriction to protect 
state-created substantive rights. See 497 F. Supp. at 1123. 
63. 380 U.S. at 473-74. 
64. See Ely, supra note 42, at 721. 
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over, the Rules of Decision Act itself directs federal courts to apply 
state law except when "Acts of Congress otherwise require or pro-
vide."65 Furthermore, the Enabling Act contains the statement that all 
laws in conflict with the Federal Rules shall be of no further force or 
effect.66 
The next step in Professor Ely's reasoning is the determination of 
the nature of t~e substantive rights protected under the Enabling Act 
or, more precisely, the formulation of a test for determining when a 
Rule runs afoul of the Enabling Act's independent substantive-proce-
dural distinction. He proposes we begin by looking to the character of 
the state provision to be supplanted by the enforcement of a Federal 
Rule.67 If that state provision embodies a substantive policy rather 
than simply a different view of what is the fairest and· most efficient 
mode of conducting litigation,68 the Federal Rule should not be ap-
plied.69 A substantive policy or, more particularly, a right derived from 
such a policy, is to be defined "as a right granted for one or more non-
procedural reasons, for some purpose or purposes not having to do with 
the fairness or efficiency of the litigation process.'010 Professor Ely 
places emphasis on the purposes or policies of the state rule because he 
assumes the subversion of state substantive policies was what Congress 
by the second sentence of the Act sought to avoid.71 Recognizing that a 
state provision can have both procedural and substantive goals, he ar-
gues that the att~mpt must be to identify that goal which transcends 
concern for the conduct of litigation. 72 If that nonprocedural goal is 
frustrated by the application of a Federal Rule, the specific prohibition 
of the second sentence of the Enabling Act overrides the general power 
of the first sentence.73 The goals or purposes protected thereby are de-
fined, under Professor Ely's analysis, primarily as those which are non-
procedural, which makes unnecessary the further step of independently 
65. 28 u.s.c. § 1652 (1976). 
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). A Federal Rule may not enjoy the same status as an Act 
passed by the Congress and signed by the President, but it does override those rules requiring 
adherence to state procedure. See Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 554 F.2d 1165, 1168 
n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1977); cf Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 284 (1976) (White J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part). 
67. See Ely, supra note 42, at 722. 
68. Jd 
69. See id at 734. 
70. ld at 725. 
71. See id at 724 n.l70. He also recognizes that a focus on a Rule's effects would make any 
test either unintelligible or would lead to the wholesale defeat of Congress's attempt to establish 
uniform rules since any rule can arguably have procedural and substantive effects. See 497 F. 
Supp. at 1123. 
72. See Ely at supra note 42, at 726. 
73. See id at 719, 734. 
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identifying them as substantive.74 Moreover, he carefully avoids the 
need to look to the often nonexistent legislative history75 of a state pro-
vision by looking instead to the language of the state provision itself to 
find evidence of its purposes. 76 
In applying his test to Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse 
Co. ,77 Professor Ely finds that the Court in applying a state provision 
requiring service of process, instead of Rule 3, to determine whether 
that diversity action was properly commenced was correct but for the 
wrong reason.78 The Court mistakenly applied the Erie rule to decide 
the case but by refusing to apply Rule 3 had, in effect, protected a non-
procedural policy of the state commencement provision. One of the 
purposes of a statute of limitations, which is directly served· by a service 
requirement, is the protection of a potential defendant's right to 
"breathe easy" after the expiration of the limitations period.79 To find 
that only the filing of a complaint within that period was required 
would have frustrated that policy and the right engendered thereby. 
The fact that perhaps only a minor delay in giving the defendant notice 
would result was not seen by Professor Ely as significant since "the 
difference between the actual provisions was a difference between no-
tice and no notice, and that goes to the essence of the right the state 
legislature seems to have been trying to create. " 80 
Once one encounters the compelling clarity of Professor Ely's 
thinking it is difficult to break free of its spell, but his conclusion, if 
accepted, would cause lawyers some substantial research problems. In 
a diversity case one must first identify the state rule to be supplanted by 
an applicable Federal Rule. This would not be difficult if the conflict-
ing state provision were contained in a well-indexed code of state pro-
cedure. As has been noted the existence of one such state rule does not, 
of course, foreclose the possibility that another rule on the subject 
might exist.81 Even a state rule contained in a body of procedural rules 
may have nonprocedural purposes. For example, Professor Ely sug-
gests that the broad scope of discovery allowed under rule 26(b )(1) of 
the Federal Rules might well be subject to an Enabling Act challenge if 
a state's narrower discovery provisions were based on concerns for 
74. See id. at 725 n.l72. 
75. See id. at 724 n.l7l. 
76. See id. at 726. 
77. 337 u.s. 530 (1949). 
78. See Ely, supra note 42, at 730. 
79. /d. at 731. 
80. /d. at 731 n.203. 
81. Sec text accompanying notes 12 and 13, supra. 
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privacy.82 
If research revealed no state procedural or statutory provision on 
the subject, then research of state court decisions would be required to 
determine why the state legislature has not spoken on the matter. In 
applying his analysis to the facts of Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. , 83 Profes-
sor Ely suggests that if the Court had found the otherwise applicable 
state law did not provide for the medical examination ordered in that 
case pursuant to Rule 35, it should have proceeded to determine why 
this was so. 84 He then discusses the possible reasons for such a failure; 
but he omits an important step, that is, finding the state authority for 
those reasons. If a state's highest court has elaborated on the reasons 
for the state's refusal to allow medical examination of litigants, a less 
sophisticated lawyer than Professor Ely could perhaps carry out his 
analysis. This may often not be the case. A substantial problem often 
encountered in diversity cases is simply determining what the court-
made law of a state is on a particular subject when the state's highest 
court has not decided the matter. An extensive body of federal law has 
been created, under the label of Pullman abstention, to deal with cases 
in which part of the federal court's problem is caused by unclear state 
law.85 
If the potentially applicable state law can be identified with some 
degree of certainty, one could then proceed to identify the arguably 
nonprocedural purposes or goals of that law. We can assume that if the 
Court accepted Professor Ely's argument, his test would receive judicial 
elaboration and, hopefully, competent lawyers could use it with some 
degree of proficiency. Those lawyers, being competent, would also be 
able to generate substantial extra federal pretrial and appellate litiga-
tion on the rather subtle issues necessarily inherent in this mode of 
analysis. Of course, to this point we have considered only the need to 
research the law of one state; but modern choice of law rules, in their 
focus on significant contracts, open the door to the possibility that fo-
rum choice among states could determine which state's law was poten-
tially applicable. 86 Plaintiffs lawyer would then need to research the 
82. Ely, supra note 42, at 722 n.162. 
83. 312 U.S. I (1941). 
84. See Ely supra note 42, at 734. In Sibbach the petitioner challenged the authority of the 
lower federal court to order her to submit to a medical examination as it was authorized to do by 
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. She admitted that Rule 35 was a rule of proce-
dure but contended that it abridged her substantive rights in violation of the second sentence of 
the Rules Enabling Act. The law of the state in which the cause arose allowed such examinations, 
but the forum state did not. 312 U.S. at 6-11. 
85. See generally Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
86. See generally R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 12, at 566-69. 
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law of those states in which suit might be brought. 87 
Although the failure to discover or perceive a state substantive 
policy might not cause every federal litigant to lose his lawsuit, no liti-
gant in federal diversity cases could afford to rely on the Federal Rules 
without extensive, additional research and without suffering a great 
deal of anxiety. One of the primary purposes for establishing uniform 
federal procedural rules was to avoid having a different federal proce-
dure in each state. 88 The Enabling Act was intended also to provide 
readily ascertainable rules that would facilitate the interstate practice of 
law.89 To accomplish this goal the Rules were shaped by the notion 
that what was needed was a simplified practice without unnecessary 
technicalities or distinCtions so that litigation in federal court could 
proceed efficiently and inexpensively to an adjudication on the mer-
its.90 Should Professor Ely's test be accepted, those important purposes 
would be substantially frustrated. 91 
B. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Should Be Presumed Valid 
The Supreme Court has refused to ·construe the delegation of 
power to administrative agencies so as to defeat the manifest purpose 
of the delegating Act.92 It has, in fact, sought to construe such statutory 
powers in light of the complexity of the subject matter to be regulated 
and the resulting need for flexible regulatory powers.93 As the Court 
stated in Yakus v. United States, "Congress is not confined to that 
method of executing its policy which involves the least possible delega-
tion of discretion to administrative officers."94 
Neither Congress nor the Court need show even this level of con-
cern in determining whether a Federal Rule is within the delegation of 
the Enabling Act because, unlike most instances of delegation, that Act 
requires the reporting of any proposed rule to Congress before it can 
87. There would, of course, be restrictions as to personal jurisdiction but International Shoe 
and its progeny and state long-arm statutes would still provide leeway. See International Shoe v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
88. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963), cited 
with approval in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472-73 (1965). 
89. 497 F. Supp. at 11.20. 
90. Address of Attorney General Cummings to Judicial Conference, Fourth Circuit (June 6, 
1935), reprinted in 2! A.B.A.J. 403 (1935). See FED. R. C1v. P. I (''They shall be construed to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."). 
91. Consider this prospect in light of the fact 39,315 diversity cases were commenced between 
June 30, 1979 and June 30, 1980. See THE LAWYER'S ALMANAC 1981-1982: A CORNUCOPIA OF 
INFORMATION ABOUT LAW, LAWYERS AND THE PROFESSION 536. 
92. Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 283-84 
(1933). 
93. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219-20 (1943). 
94. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425-26 (1944). 
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become effective. Once reported, Congress has a period of time within 
which it can review and, if it so desires, veto a proposed rule. In this 
way, Congress enjoys the benefit of the expertise of the Court and the 
Advisory Committee in promulgating procedural rules yet still retains 
final control in evaluating the particular~. of any proposaP5 It is this 
power of final review that provides the means by which Congress can 
avoid the subversion of state or federal policies. Congress has, in fact, 
exercised this power in dramatic fashion by staying the effective date of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence.96 When it finally enacted the Federal 
Rules of Evidence,97 it also enacted a statute to govern amendments to 
those Rules.98 In that Act Congress retained an extensive review 
power. Consequently, Congress need not rely on any inflexible stan-
dard gleaned from the words of the Enabling Act; it can take such ac-
tion as it sees fit through the exercise of its waiting period veto power. 
By the active use of this power, Congress can protect those interests to 
be affected by a proposed rule and do so before that rule becomes part 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Furthermore, when Congress enacted the Rules Enabling Act in 
1934, it could not have been so singularly concerned with the subver-
sion of state substantive law.99 To begin with, the Enabling Act does 
not expressly prohibit the modification of state substantive rights. The 
original version of the Act prohibited modification of the "substantive 
rights of any litigant." 100 One commentator noted in 1935 that this pro-
vision was possibly a reference to the distinction made under the Con-
formity Act in determining whether state procedural law was to be used 
in federal court. 101 The Conformity Act of 1872 had required federal 
district courts to conform generally to the practice, pleadings, and 
95. This "waiting period" type of legislative veto allows Congress to control policy as the 
need develops rather than in advance by the establishment of elaborate standards. See Bruff & 
Gellhom, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 
HAR.v. L. REv. 1369, 1373 (1977). The veto power is a method by which Congress can insure that 
rule-making is consistent with its intent. Id at 1417. There was also some existing authority to 
allow Congress confidence that the waiting period veto retained in the Rules Enabling Act was 
constitutional at least when the veto was exercised through legislation. See 37 Op. Att'y Gen. 56, 
63 (1933). 
96. Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976) 
as noted to that section). 
97. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (reprinted in 28 U.S. C.§ 2071 (1976) 
as note to that section). 
98. 28 u.s.c. § 2076 (1976). 
99. Ely, supra note 42, at 724 n.l70. Professor Ely assumes that it was the subversion of state 
substantive policies that the framers of the Enabling Act wished to avoid. 
100. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 
(1976)). 
101. See Sunderland, Cluuacter and Extent of the Rule-Making Power Granted U.S. Supreme 
Court and Methods of Effective Exercise, 21 A.B.A.J. 404, 405 (1935). 
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modes of proceeding existing in the states in which they were located 
when they heard civil cases other than equity and admiralty, unless 
some other Act of Congress provided otherwise. 102 During this same 
period the federal courts, under the rule of Swtft v. Tyson, 103 engaged in 
the creation and application of general federal common law in diversity 
cases at the expense of the otherwise applicable substantive law of the 
states. 104 It was not until four years after the Enabling Act was passed 
that Erie R.R. v. Tompkins made sensitivity for state substantive rights 
the centerpiece of any discussion of federal adjudication in diversity 
cases. 
The Enabling Act was also passed shortly after the first wave of 
New Deal legislation during which Congress had vigorously exercised 
its power in an attempt to solve the economic depression. 105 Moreover, 
it was not until one year after the passage of the Act that the Supreme 
Court, for the first time in American history, invalidated a federal law 
because of an unlawful delegation of legislative power by Congress. 106 
Congress had little reason therefore, after so recently flexing its consti-
tutional muscles, to be so cautious as to rigidly circumscribe the 
rulemaking power it granted the Supreme Court and over which it re-
tained ultimate control. 
What then did it mean to do by including in the Enabling Act 
what is now its second sentence? If one begins by recognizing that law-
yers all too often define procedure by its relation to, or in contrast to, 
substantive law, we can better understand the language of the Enabling 
Act. After stating in the Act that the rules were to regulate "the forms 
of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and proce-
dure" in civil actions, Congress would naturally wish to clarify the 
scope of power granted by further stating, with what must have seemed 
then and now to be the best term available, that these rules are not to 
create or abridge substantive rights. 107 Congress, in the first sentence, 
listed a number of the matters to be regulated by these rules rather than 
simply providing for the prescribing of procedural rules. It follows 
therefore that the second sentence would speak only of matters not to 
be regulated-that is, substantive rights rather than substantive rules. 
102. Chisholm v. Gilmer, 299 U.S. 99, 102 (1936). 
103. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I, 18 (1842). 
104. Even under Swift , state statutory law was to be applied in diversity cases, but the applica-
tion of a state statute was not determined by the use of a substantive-procedural distinction. See 
id. at 18. 
105. E. BARREIT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 220 (1977). 
106. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); see Stem, The Commerce Clause and 
the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HAR.v. L. REv. 645, 658 (1946). 
107. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). 
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Viewed in this light the second sentence is not a special insistence on 
protection for substantive rights but is instead an attempt to use those 
terms as a negative characterization of the rulemaking power to be ex-
ercised. In short, the language of the Enabling Act just as easily sup-
ports the proposition that Congress intended to exercise thereby the 
whole of its constitutional power over federal civil procedure. 
As the Court stated in Sihhach, the "new policy envisaged in the 
enabling act of 1934 was that the whole field of court procedure be 
regulated in the interest of speedy, fair and exact determination of the 
truth." 108 In that opinion the Court read the first and second sentences 
of the Act to stand for the proposition that the Supreme Court was not 
to regulate substantive rights in the "guise" of regulating procedure. 109 
In other words, the Court may not under the pretext of prescribing pro-
cedural rules go beyond Congress's constitutional power to provide for 
the mechanical process of adjudication in the lower federal courts. The 
Court in Sihhach stated that the test under the Act is ''whether a rule 
really regulates procedure,-the judicial process for enforcing rights 
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering 
remedy and redress for disregard or infraction ofthem." 110 Moreover, 
the Supreme Court stated in Hanna that questions "concerning the 
scope of the Enabling Act and the constitutionality of specific Federal 
Rules [are to be decided] in light of the distinction set forth in 
Sihhach." 111 
Congress, therefore, has attempted through the Enabling Act to 
provide for the exercise of its full constitutional power over federal pro-
cedure, including the power to regulate matters or rights which fall 
within the ''uncertain area between substance and procedure." 112 One 
might argue that if substantive rights can be identified, they are not 
within an ''uncertain area." The fallacy of this argument lies in the 
assumption that in the gray area between substantive and procedural 
law, substantive rights can be identified through scientific inquiry with 
some degree of unanimity. Professor Ely's article represents perhaps 
the most sophisticated attempt to provide such a scientific test; but be-
sides the practical difficulty of application, it also involves subtleties 
that would often lead to opposite conclusions. Furthermore, the time 
for this inquiry is before a Rule becomes effective. If the potential ef-
fect on an identified substantive right has not been brought to the atten-
108. 312 U.S. at 14. 
109. ld at 10. See text accompanying notes 51-53, supra. 
110. Id at 14. 
Ill. 380 U.S. at 470-71 (emphasis added). 
112. Id at 472. 
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tion of the Supreme Court and Congress before this point they would 
have acted in that "uncertain" area to promulgate the new Rule. In 
other words, a Rule that has survived the multi-step process necessary 
for its approval, during which its effects have been considered, should 
be presumed valid to the extent of its application under both the Con-
stitution and the Enabling Act unless no rational basis exists for classi-
fying it as a procedural rule. 113 
Prior to final approval, a proposed rule can be changed to accom-
modate substantive rights identified as Professor Ely suggests. When 
substantive or other policies are protected at this stage from subversion 
by a proposed and arguably procedural rule, they can be protected be-
cause of current considerations without the need to refer to limitations 
supposedly frozen in place within the Enabling Act. Protection pro-
vided in this way would also not undercut the purposes of the Federal 
Rules, and litigants could rely on those Rules so as to efficiently bring 
their cases to adjudication on the merits. 
Presuming the Rules valid does not result in the sacrifice of sub-
stantive rights because the federal courts can and do refuse to interpret 
Rules broadly when to do so would displace otherwise applicable sub-
stantive law.U4 The Supreme Court in Walker stated, however, that 
the Rules were not to be interpreted contrary to their plain meaning 
and that if a conflict arose between a Rule and state law, the analysis of 
Hanna v. Plumer was to be applied. 115 Moreover, many of the Rules 
expressly accomodate state law by providing for its control116 or by 
providing for its use as an alternative means of proceeding. 117 
State substantive rights are therefore protected by the Supreme 
Court and the Advisory Committee through a process of sensitive 
drafting of proposed rules, including participation by the legal profes-
113. See Id; Westen & Lehman, Is There Life for Erie after the IJeath of IJiversity? 78 MICH. 
L. REv. 311, 364 (1980). • 
114. See, e.g., Walker, 446 U.S. at 751 (Rule 3 not a commencement); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 
U.S. 109, 117 (1943) (affirmative defenses not created by Rule 8(c)); Arrowsmith v. United Press 
lnt'l, 320 F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1963) (amenability to service not established by Rule 4(d)(7) or 
4(a)); Covel v. Safetech, Inc., 90 F.R.D. 427, 433 (D. Mass. 1981) (application of substantive state 
rule more liberal than Rule 15(c)). 
115. Walker, 446 U.S. at 750 n.9. 
116. See, e.g. , FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(2) (service upon an infant or incompetent person in the 
manner prescribed by law of state in which service is made); FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b) (capacity of 
individual determined by law of domicile). 
117. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(7) (service upon individuals or corporations in the manner 
prescribed by the law of the state in which district court is held); FED. R. C1v. P. 4(e) (service upon 
party not an inhabitant or found within the state in accordance with statute or rule of court of 
state in which district court is held); FED. R. Civ. P. 27(a)(4) (deposition before action admissible 
if admissible in courts of state where taken); FED. R. C1v. P. 45(e) (service of subpoena according 
to statute or rule of court). 
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sion and the public; by Congress through the use of its review and veto 
power over proposed rules; and by the courts through the enlightened 
use of their power of interpretation. To also require that a clearly ap-
plicable Rule be disregarded because of an effect on an arguably sub-
stantive right would amount to a rigid adherence to a concept of states' 
rights that is blind to legitimate needs for the efficient and inexpensive 
adjudication of actions in federal courts. 118 
IV. CONSIDERATIONS FOR REDRAFTING RULE 3 
SUBSTANTIVE STATE POLICIES-SERVICE AND NOTICE 
REQUIREMENTS 
A proposed amendment to Rule 3 must, at a minimum, constitute 
a rule that would be rationally capable of being characterized as proce-
dural. More precisely, it must be reasonably related to the mechanics 
of the judicial process of adjudicating rights and liabilities; then the 
proposed Rule would be within Congress's constitutional rulemaking 
power and also valid under the Rules Enabling Act. Beyond constitu-
tional and statutory considerations, however, lie the legitimate policy 
concerns that will have significance in determining whether any pro-
posed change in the Federal Rules will survive the multi-step process 
necessary for approval. Obviously, the primary concern in proposing 
to make Rule 3 a commencement provision for purposes of statutes of 
limitations is that such a Rule might supplant contrary state com-
mencement provisions representing substantive policy decisions. These 
substantive policies therefore must be identified and considered in the 
drafting of this proposal. 
A. Actions Required of the Plaintiff and Their Purposes 
State laws regulating commencement of an action for limitations 
purposes vary widely in regard to the action required of the plaintiff. 119 
liS. q: Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (federalism does not require blind defer-
ence to state's rights). 
119. See ALA. R. C1v. P, 3 (1977) (filing of complaint), construed in Ward v. Saben Appliance 
Co., 391 So.2d 1030, 1035 (Ala. 1980) (filing of complaint within-limitations period with intent to 
have process immediately served); ALAsKA R. C1v. P. 3 (1978) (filing of complaint); Aluz. R. CIV. 
P. 3, 6(t) (1981) (filing of complaint), construed in Murphey v. Valenzuela, 95 Ariz. 30, 32-33, 386 
P.2d 78, 80-81 (1963) (filing commences action but failure to use due diligence in obtaining service 
may cause abatement); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-301 (1979) (filing complaint and placing summons 
in hands of sheriff of proper county); CAL. CIV. PRoc. CoDE§ 350 (Deering 1972) (filing of com-
plaint); CoLO. R. CIV. P. 3 (Supp. 1980) (filing a complaint or service of summons); Broderick v. 
Jackman, 167 Conn. 96, 98, 355 A.2d 234, 235 (1974) (writ served on defendant); DEL. SuPER. CT. 
CIV. P.R. 3(a) (1975) (filing of complaint and praecipe directing issuance of writ), construed in 
Russell v. Olmedo, 275 A.2d 249, 250 (Del. 1971) (to commence tolling statute of limitations, must 
also diligently seek to bring defendant into court); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-946 (1981) (Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure applicable); FLA. R. C1v. P. 1.050 (West 1967) (filing of complaint or 
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A large number of states require only the filing of the plaintiffs plead-
petition); GA. CODE ANN. § 81-112 (1956) (repealed for certain purposes by GA. CODE ANN. § 81-
1506 (Supp. 1980)) (filing of petition); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 657-22 (1976) (issuance of process 
with intent it be served); IDAHO CODE§ 5-228 (1979) (filing of complaint); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 
t 13(1) (Smith-Hurd 1968) (filing of complaint); IND. R. TR. P. 3 (Bums 1973) (filing of com-
plaint); IowA R. C!v. P. 48 (Supp. 1981) (filing of complaint); KAN. C1v. PRo. CODE ANN. § 60-
203 and§ 61-1703 (Vernon 1976) (filing of petition if service is obtained within 90 days, otherwise 
time of service); Kv. REv. STAT. § 413.250 (1972), Kv. R. C!v. P. 3 (1972) (issuance of first sum-
mons or process in good faith); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-5801 (West, Supp. 1981), LA. CODE CIV. 
PRoc. ANN. art. 421 (West 1960) (filing of plaintiffs pleading in proper court); ME. REv. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 14 § 553 (West 1980), ME. R. CT. 3 (West 1980) (service or filing of complaint, whichever 
occurs first); Mo. R. PRe. 140 & 170 (1977) (filing of original pleading); MAss. R. C!v. P. 3 (1974) 
(filing of complaint and .entry fee); MICH. G. CT. R. 101 (1976); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.5856 
(1979), construed in Buscaino v. Rhodes, 385 Mich. 474, 189 N.W.2d 202 (1971) (filing of com-
plaint); MINN. R. C1v. P. 3.01 (1979) (service or delivery of summons to proper officer if service 
completed within 60 days); In re Estate of Stanback., 222 So.2d 660, 662-63 (Miss. 1969) (petition 
must be presented to clerk. with intent summons issue without delay); Mo. R. · C!v. P. 53.01 
(Vernon 1976) (filing of complaint), construed in Votaw v. Schmittgens, 538 S.W.2d 884, 886 (Mo. 
App. 1976) (filing of complaint plus due diligence in obtaining service); MONT. CooE ANN. § 20 
(1979), MONT. R. C!V. P. 3 (1979) (filing of complaint); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 25-217 (1979) (filing of 
petition if service obtained within six months); NEv. R. C1v. P. 3 (1979) (filing of complaint); 
Clark. v. Slayton, 63 N.H. 402, IA.ll3 (1885) (filing with intent writ be served); N.J . R. Civ. P. 4:2-
2 (1969), construed in Farrell v. Votator Div. Chemetron Corp., 62 N.J. Ill , 299 A.2d 394 (1973) 
(filing of complaint); N.M. R. C1v. P. 3 (1978), construed in Prieto v. Home Educ. Livelihood 
Program, 94 N.M. 738, 616 P.2d 1123 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (filing of complaint); N.Y. C1v. 
PRAcT. LAW§ 203 (a,b) (McKinney 1972) as amended (McKinney Supp. 1981) (service of process 
generally); N.C. R. C1v. P. 3 (1969) (filing of complaint or issuance of summons); N.D. CENT. 
CoDE§ 28-01-38 (1974) (service of process or delivery of summons to proper officer with intent it 
be served if thereafter within 60 days it is served); N.D.R. C!v. P. 3 (1971) (commence by service 
of summons); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2305.17 (Baldwin 1971), OHIO R. CIV. P. 3 (Baldwin 1971) 
(filing of petition and praecipe if service is obtained within one year); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 
§ 97 (West Supp. 1981) (service of process or diligent attempt to procure service if service is ob-
tained within 60 days); OR. REv. STAT.§ 12.020 (1979) (service of process or filing of complaint if 
service is obtained within 60 days); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 1007 (Purdon 1975), PA. R. Civ. P. 
§ 1007 (West 1981) (filing a praecipe for writ of summons); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 9-1-12 (1970) (filing, 
depositing in mail addressed to clerk. or delivereQ to officer for service), construed in Caprio v. 
Fanning & Doorley Constr. Co., 243 A.2d 738 (R.I. 1968) (filing of complaint with due diligence 
in seeking service); S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10-101, 10-401 (Le.w. Coop. 1976) (service of summons), 
construed in First Nat'! Bank. v. Hair, 20 S.E.2d 219 (S.C. 1942) (delivery of summons to sheriff 
with intent it be served is sufficient); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 15-2-30 (1967) (service of sum-
mons); TENN. R. CIV. P. 3 (1981) (filing of complaint with diligence in seeking issuance and serv-
ice); TEx. R. CIV. P. 22 (Vernon 1981) (filing of petition), construed in Strickland v. Denver City, 
559 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (filing plus due diligence in procuring issuance and service 
required); UTAH R. C!V. P. 3(a) (1977) (filing or service); VT. R. CIV. P. 3 (1971) (filing a com-
plaint), construed in Weisburgh v. McClure Newspapers, Inc., 396 A.2d 1388 (Vt. 1979) (timely 
service must also be accomplished); VA. S. CT. R. 3.33 (1977) (filing of original pleading); WASH. 
REv. CoDE ANN.§ 4.16.170 (1971) (filing of complaint or service of summons whichever occurs 
first), construed in Fox v. Groff, 16 Wash. App. 893, 559 P.2d 1376 (3d Div. 1977) (filing is suffi-
cient only when service is subsequently effected within the statutory period and within 90 days of 
such filing); W. VA. R. C!V. P. 3 (1978) (filing of complaint); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 801.02(1) (West 
1981) (filing of summons and complaint if service is obtained within 60 days); Wvo. R. Civ. P. 3 
(1979) (filing of complaint if service is obtained within 60 days, otherwise when service is 
obtained). 
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ing or filing followed by due diligence in seeking to obtain service. 
Some states require filing plus the issuance of summons with intent it 
be served and others require filing plus service of process. A number of 
states do not require that filing precede service and may therefore re-
quire either filing or service to commence an action. Filing may also be 
deemed the act of commencement only when service is obtained within 
a set period thereafter. At least twelve states require service within a 
calculable period, and a substantial number of others put emphasis on 
the use of diligence in obtaining service on the defendant in order to 
properly commence an action. 
Since a commencement provision plays a significant role in the 
application of the state's statute of limitations, the policies it promotes 
must be ascertained by reference to the part it plays in the whole of the 
state's limitations policy. 120 It has been said that the primary purpose 
of a statute of limitations is to protect defendants. 121 A statute of limi-
tations is, in this sense, a legislative decision that after the specified 
period a defendant should be able to assume he is free of liability and 
should not thereafter be required to muster his defenses. The limita-
tions period is also, at least in part, a recognition that after a certain 
time evidence may have been lost to the defendant because of the fad-
ing of memories or the disappearance of witnesses. 122 Moreover, by 
120. Determining when a particular provision is an "integral" part of a state's limitations pol-
icy is also a matter of some difficulty for the plaintiff in federal court. Prior to the Walker decision 
the lower federal courts had looked to a variety of factors to determine whether a commencement 
provision was an integral part of a state statute of limitations. The federal courts have looked to 
language in state court decisions on this issue, see Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 592 F.2d 
1118, 1122 (lOth Cir. 1979); Prashar v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 480 F.2d 947,951 (8th Cir. 
1973); whether the provision was contained in the same article or chapter as the statute of limita-
tions, as opposed to being part of the state's rules of procedure, see Chappell v. Rouch, 448 F.2d 
446, 449-50 (lOth Cir. 1971); whether the provision specifically referred to the statute of limita-
tions, see 592 F.2d at 1122; 448 F.2d at 449-50; or whether the provision served other purposes in 
addition to regulating compliance with statutes of limitations, see 480 F.2d at 951-52; Chladek v. 
Stems Transp. Co., 427 F. Supp. 270, 274 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Schinker v. Ruud Mfg. Co., 386 F. 
Supp. 626, 632 (N.D. Iowa 1974). 
In Walker the Supreme Court looked to whether the applicable state provision (requiring 
service of process) promoted the purposes of the statute of limitations. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 
751. "It is these policy aspects which make the service requirement an 'integral' part of the statute 
of limitations . . .. " ld at 751-52. Therefore, the factors considered significant by the lower 
courts would be relevant primarily to the choice between state provisions such as when there is 
one general and one specific provision. When one state provision exists which is enforced by state 
courts for limitations purposes, the policies reflected by that provision must be considered regard-
less of whether it is described as integral, is a general civil rule, or has other purposes. See 2 I. 
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE§ 3.07 (4.-3-1), at 3-95 (1981). 
121. See generally JJevelopmenls, supra note 19, at 1185. 
122. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751 (1980); American Pipe & Constr. Co. 
v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974); Order of R. R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 
321 u.s. 342, 348-49 (1944). 
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setting a time limit the legislature may well have considered the likeli-
hood that in adjudicating claims brought after that limit a court would 
have difficulty in accurately determining fact issues because of the un-
availability of evidence. 
B. Actual Notice-The Underlying Purpose of the 
Service Requirement 
A commencement provision that requires service on the defendant 
within a specified period directly promotes these limitations policies. 123 
Such a provision requires timely notice so as to alert the defendant to 
the need for preserving evidence and thereby promotes the purpose of 
protecting the judicial fact-finding process.124 A requirement of service 
within a set or calculable period also provides the potential defendant a 
tool by which he can accurately calculate the deadline after which he 
may have peace of mind. 125 Mter that deadline he can assume his lia-
bility under that claim has evaporated and thus allocate his resouces to 
needs other than his legal defense in court. Professor Ely has identified 
this latter purpose of a service requirement as nonprocedural and 
therefore substantive in that it is not related to the conduct of litiga-
tion. 126 A requirement that the defendant be notified of suit within a 
calculable period also appears nonprocedural when characterized ac-
cording to the expectations it engenders. Furthermore, consideration 
123. Cf. Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 487. 
124. In Walker , the United States Supreme Court, in applying the refined outcome-determina-
tive test of Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 466-68, held that a service requirement was substantive 
in the Erie sense. Walker, 446 U.S. at 752-53. Upon analysis the Court's reasoning proceeded as 
follows: (1) Rule 3 does not apply, therefore, Erie does; (2) State statutes of limitations are to be 
applied under Erie-York; (3) the Oklahoma Service requirement is an integral part of that state's 
statute of limitations and this suit would be barred in Oklahoma courts; therefore (4) to allow the 
cause to proceed in federal court would perhaps not promote forum shopping, but would consti-
tute an inequitable administration of the law. One might wonder why a state-enforced require-
ment of filing plus issuance of the summons (but not service) would not be part and parcel of the 
state's statute of limitations even though it did not promote limitations policies. A response is that 
such a requirement would not be outcome-determinative under Hanna since failure to apply it 
would not promote forum shopping or constitute the inequitable administration of law-to the 
defendant's detriment. When the Court in Walker found the Oklahoma provision was an integral 
part of the statute of limitations by noting that it promoted limitations policies, it perhaps was 
accomplishing two purposes at once--6howing that this provision was substantive not procedural 
to distinguish Rule 3 and demonstrating that the failure to apply it would be outcome-determina-
tive. It should be noted that in the absence of an applicable Federal Rule of Civil Procedure even 
a clearly procedural state rule might be applicable under the Hanna outcome-determinative test. 
See Ely, supra note 42, at 721. 
125. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 751 n.l2. 
126. See Ely, supra note 42, at 730-31. It might appear that such a requirement is substantive 
because it is part of the measurement of the life of a substantive claim. Any commencement 
provision, however, becomes a part of the measurement of a claim's life if it is applied. The 
question is whether it should be applied. 
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of the deadline leads a potential defendant to think in terms of freedom 
from suit rather than in terms of defense in court. 
The Supreme Court in Walker concluded that, in contrast to Rule 
3, the Oklahoma requirement of service applied in that case was a 
"statement of a substantive decision by that State." 127 The Court 
found Rule 3 inapplicable and proceeded to hold that the state rule 
must, under Erie, be applied because failure to do so would constitute 
the inequitable administration of law. 128 In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court noted that this service requirement furthers the policy deci-
sion that each defendant has a "legitimate right not to be surprised by 
notice of a law-suit" after the limitations period. 129 The Court also 
noted that this notice policy was further evidenced by Oklahoma's al-
lowance of commencement as to defendants "united in interest" with 
other defendants who had received timely service. 130 Such a defendant 
would presumably have received actual notice of the lawsuit through a 
related co-defendant who had received timely service and would 
thereby have his peace of mind disturbed within the limitations period. 
Such a defendant would have knowledge, although received through 
informal means, within the period the state deems it feasible for him to 
gather and preserve his evidence. 131 
Without straining the Court's reasoning it can be said that actual 
notice is, in reality, the state's goal. The requirement of service to pro-
vide notice is merely a means of assuring that it is received. Actual 
notice of suit when received, through whatever means, within the pe-
riod prescribed by state law effectively serves the purposes of a statute 
of limitations. Had the Court in Walker been presented with a conflict 
between the Oklahoma service requirement and a federal judge-made 
rule that filing plus actual notice, even though informally conveyed, 
satisfies a statute of limitations, it would not have been justified in con-
cluding that the choice of that federal rule would have constituted the 
inequitable administration of law. The goal of both rules would be 
identical and only the means applied for achieving that goal would dif-
fer. When the goal of both federal and state rules was giving actual 
notice, differences in the manner or means of serving process was not 
deemed determinative by the Court in Hanna . 132 It is, of course, not 
the identification of a rule as a means to an end that is decisive; it is the 
127. Walker , 446 U.S. at 751. 
128. Id at 753. 
129. Id at 751 n.l2. 
130. Id at 752 n.l2. 
131. See id 
132. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). The court in Hanna noted the common goal of the conflicting rules, 
see id at 462 n.l , and went on in its considered dictum to conclude that such a variance would not 
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recognition that this hypothetical federal rule would fully serve the 
same policies promoted by the state rule. The state rule does provide 
the additional "right" to transmission of notice by formal service of 
process. The only purpose for requiring service of process in addition 
to actual notice, however, is to remove questions about the receipt or 
sufficiency of that notice from state court consideration. If the rule was 
that the defendant need only be given, through any means, information 
sufficient to alert him within the limitations period of the filing of suit, 
the court would be required to determine that the information was re-
ceived in time and was sufficient. To go further and require service of 
process removes the need for the court to determine these issues; it need 
only determine the timeliness of service. The state policy represented 
by the requirement of service rather than only actual notice is always, 
in a sense, served when those questions as to timeliness and sufficiency 
of notice are to be determined by a federal not a state court. This anal-
ysis is another way of showing that a service requirement of a state 
. commencement provision is related only to the manner of giving notice 
and is, therefore, purely procedural in nature. 133 
Applying Professor Ely's test we can say that the only non-
procedural right provided a defendant by a state service requirement is 
the right to actual notice within the period prescribed by state law. 134 
Should the defendant receive sufficient notice, even though transmitted 
informally, he cannot legitimately enjoy peace of mind and would also 
be alerted to the need to gather and preserve his defensive evidence. 
All of the potentially substantive policies of a statute of limitations are 
served when the defendant is given sufficient information of the filing 
of the suit within the limitations period. 135 
On the other hand, a state provision that does not require some 
sort of notice within the limitations period or a set period thereafter 
fails to directly promote any of the policies of a statute of limitations. 
This type of provision instead represents a decision to protect plaintiffs 
from limitations problems arising in court by allowing commencement 
of a suit through steps that can be taken rapidly and over which plain-
constitute the unfair discrimination against citizens of the forum state with which Erie was con-
cerned. See id at 468 n.9, 469. 
133. The defendant, of course, will claim his right to service, but this is nothing more than a 
claim to have everything as it would be in state court. The question under Erie is not whether 
litigation in federal court varies from what it would have been in state court, but whether there is 
good reason in the Erie sense for not allowing certain variances. See 380 U.S. at 468. 
134. See Ely, supra note 42, at 731. Professor Ely in discussing Ragan v. Merchants Transfer 
& Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949), made the point that the difference in that case, between 
Rule 3 and a state service requirement, was a difference between notice and no notice. ld at 731 
n.203. There would be no such difference in the hypothetical presented. 
135. See 414 U.S. at 554-55. 
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tiff has greater control. Without a requirement of notice to the defend-
ant he is not alerted within a prescribed period to the need for 
preserving evidence and this may work to impair the accuracy of the 
judicial fact-finding process. Moreover, without such a requirement a 
potential defendant has no deadline after which he can legitimately 
have peace of mind. 136 In short, any commencement provision not re-
quiring notice within a set period must be seen as exclusively con-
cerned with the maintenance and management of litigation and thereby 
as serving only procedural goals. 137 
The provision that informally-transmitted notice to the defendant 
will satisfy a statute of limitations is not without analogue in the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 15(c) ofthe Federal Rules provides 
for the relation back of an amended complaint, when adding a defend-
ant, to the date of the original so as to avoid the limitations defense of 
that defendant. Relation back is allowed when the claim stated in both 
the original and amended pleadings arose from the same transaction or 
occurrence and, within the limitations period, the added defendant re-
ceived such notice of the institution of the action that he would not be 
prejudiced in defending on the merits and knew or should have known 
that but for a mistake he would have been named as a defendant. 138 
Rule 15(c) has been applied in diversity actions and has not been seen 
to deprive defendants of state substantive rights or of any procedural 
due process right. 139 
136. See Walker , 446 U.S. at 751 : 
[A]ctual notice by the defendant is an integral part of the several policies served by the 
statute of limitations (citations omitted). The statute of limitations establishes a deadline 
after which the defendant may legitimately have peace of mind; it also recognizes that 
after a certain period of time it is unfair to require the defendant to attempt to piece 
together his defense to an old claim. 
137. See Ely, supra note 42, at 726. 
138. See FED. R. C1v. P. 15(c). · 
Relation Back o.f Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended plead-
ing arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the 
original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An amend-
ment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is 
satisfied and, within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him, the party 
to be brought in by amendment (I) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he 
will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have 
known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have 
been brought against him. 
The delivery or mailing of process to the United States Attorney, or his designee, or the 
Attorney General of the United States, or an agency or officer who would have been a proper 
defendant if named, satisfies the requirement of clauses (I) and (2) hereof with respect to the 
United States or any agency or officer thereof to be brought into the action as a defendant. 
139. See Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566, 568-69 (2d Cir. 1978); Skidmore v. Syntex Laborato-
ries, Inc., 529 F.2d 1244, 1249 (5th Cir. 1976); Loudenslager v. Teeple, 466 F.2d 249, 250 (3d Cir. 
1972); Crowder v. Gordons Transps., Inc., 387 F.2d 413, 415-18 (8th Cir. 1967). See generally 
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C. Should Rule J Require Formal Service or Only Notice? 
A proposal that Rule 3 be amended to expressly impose either a 
service or a notice requirement for all limitations purposes would both 
alert plaintiffs to the need to take action beyond filing and preserve any 
state policy that could be legitimately identified as substantive. Such a 
Rule would, however, conflict with the commencement rule that has 
been applied for purposes of federal statutes of limitations in a majority 
of the federal circuits. 140 In MofJre v. Sid Richardson Carbon & Gas 
Co. , 141 the court held that filing the complaint alone commenced an 
action for purposes of the four-year statute of limitations for federal 
anti-trust actions. In so doing the court found Rule 3 clearly stated that 
only filing was required. 142 Further justification for the court's holding 
was found in the legislative history of that federal statute of limitations 
and in the fact that Congress had enacted that statute subsequent to the 
adoption of the Rules. 143 This latter fact indicated to the court that 
Congress had known of the definition of commencement in Rule 3 
when it provided for the barring of an anti-trust action unless "com-
menced" within four years. 144 
The assumption that Rule 3 applies as a commencement provision 
for federal limitations purposes is subject to serious doubt since the 
decision in Walker. In that case, the Court held that Rule 3 was not 
intended to toll a state statute of limitations but was meant to govern 
the date from which various time periods required by other Rules be-
gan. 145 As has been noted, the Court expressly reserved the question 
whether Rule 3 was a commencement provision for federal statutes of 
limitations, 146 but its holding raises doubts as to the Rule's controlling 
effect in that regard. Assuming Rule 3 as it presently exists is not a 
commencement provision for any statute of limitations does not, how-
ever, compel the conclusion that the decision in Moore was wrong. 
The alternative basis for the decision is that Congress, by using the 
Note, Note: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c): Relation Back of Amendments, 57 MINN. L. 
REV. 83, 99-100 (1972); 6 C. WRIOHT & A. MILLER, supra note 55,§ 1498, 507. 
140. See Appleton Elec. Co. v. Graves Truck Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 1980); 
Caldwell v. Martin Marietta Corp., 632 F.2d ll84, ll88 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Wahl, 
583 F.2d 285, 288-89 (6th Cir. 1978); Metropolitan Paving Co. v. International Union of Operat-
ing Eng'rs., 439 F.2d 300, 306 (lOth Cir. 1971); Moore Co. v. Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline 
Co., 347 F.2d 921, 922-23 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 925 (1966); Hoffinan v. Halden, 
268 F.2d 280, 302 (9th Cir. 1959); Messenger v. United States, 231 F.2d 328, 329 (2d Cir. 1956). 
141. 347 F.2d 921 (8th Cir. 1965). 
142. Id at 922. 
143. Id at 925. 
144. See 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1976). 
145. Walker, 446 U.S. at 750-51. 
146. Id at 751 n.ll. See text accompanying notes 5-6, supra. 
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word "commencement" in a federal statute of limitations, intended to 
absorb the definition provided by Rule 3; therefore, even if Rule 3 does 
not itself operate as a commencement provision, a federal statute of 
limitations can still be interpreted to require only the filing of the com-
plaint. Many federal statutes of limitations, in fact, do speak in terms 
of commencement147 and, in addition, section 2415 of the Judicial 
Code provides that every action for money damages brought by the 
United States founded on any contract is barred "unless the complaint 
is filed within six years." 148 
A federal statute of limitations can, of course, create substantive 
rights under Professor Ely's test just as state statutes do. 149 The ques-
tion is, however, whether a particular commencement provision pro-
motes the substantive purposes of that statute. 150 As previously 
mentioned, a commencement provision that does not require notice to 
defendant within a prescribed period cannot be seen to further such 
purposes. 151 Therefore such a provision in a federal statute of limita-
tions would not be substantive in this sense, and an amended Rule 3 
which required service or notice for limitations purposes would per-
haps supersede a federal statute of limitations in that respect. 152 The 
Enabling Act states in this regard that all laws in conflict with the Fed-
eral Rules shall be of no further force or effect. 153 
Even though the requirement of only filing does not implicate sub-
stantive rights, Congress, if it had any purpose in mind, might well 
have established that requirement as part of the overall purpose of the 
related substantive right. It should be noted here that federal statutes 
147. See, e.g. , 46 U.S.C.A. § 763a (Supp. 1981) (death on high seas); 46 U.S.C. § 745 (1976) 
(admiralty suits against United States); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1976) (age discrimination in employ-
ment actions); 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1976) (actions and prosecutions to enforce antitrust laws). 
148. See 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (1976). It is difficult to conclude that this particularized require-
ment evidences a congressional understanding that commencement requires more than filing. The 
explicit requirement of filing might have been included without any intent to distinguish filing 
from commencement or, indeed, without awareness of any distinction. 
149. See Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 38 (1926). A provision relating to commencement 
contained in such a federal statute can also be said to be interrelated with value judgments under-
lying that statute. See Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 487-88; Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 
u.s. 454, 463-64 (1975). 
150. See 414 U.S. at 558 n.29. 
151. See note 137 and accompanying text, supra. 
152. In dissenting from the proposal of amendments to the Rules adopted in 1963, Justices 
Black and Douglas stated: 
We believe that while some of the Rules of Civil Procedure are simply housekeeping 
details, many determine matters so substantially affecting the rights of litigants in law-
suits that in practical effect they are the equivalent of new legislation which, in our judg-
ment, the Constitution requires to be initiated in and enacted by the Congress and 
approved by the President. 
Statement of Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas, 374 U.S. 865, 865-66 (1963). 
153. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). 
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of limitations are specially related to particular claims created by Acts 
of Congress. To establish a rigid requirement for commencement in the 
Rules would, therefore, restrict Congress's freedom in the structuring of 
the rights and remedies it creates. The Supreme Court has indicated 
that the overall policies of related federal rights should be carefully 
considered in the application of a federal statute of limitations. Thus, 
the decision to toll a federal statute of limitations is not to be deter-
mined by characterizing the matter as substantive or procedural but by 
asking whether the overall congressional purpose is effectuated by toll-
ing the federal statute of limitations under the circumstances of a par-
ticular case. 154 
A proposal to amend Rule 3 to make it a commencement provi-
sion requiring actual notice or service in all instances would be within 
the constitutional and statutory rule-making power but would be un-
duly restrictive of Congress's freedom to structure the remedial nature 
of federal substantive rights. This conclusion assumes that the Rule 
would supersede prior congressional decisions, but this assumption is 
dubious. The effect on congressional decisions related to substantive 
federal rights appears sufficient alone to avoid a rigid requirement of 
service or notice. 155 Because of these consequences both the Supreme 
Court and Congress would have legitimate reason to believe such a 
proposal would be unwise. 
V. PROPOSAL FOR AMENDING RULE 3 
A. The Proposed Amended Rule-Text and Explanation 
Rule 3 
Commencement of Action 
A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court. A 
statute of limitations shall not be deemed a bar for failure to bring an 
action in a timely fashion it within the period allowed by the applicable 
law for service of process, the difendant has instead received such notice 
of the filing of the complaint that he will not be prejudiced in maintain-
ing his difense on the merits. 
1. The existing language of Rule 3 is retained so that the definition of 
comniencement thereby provided will remain unchanged. "Com-
mencement" is not used in the proposed amendment to Rule 3 so that 
the change would neither directly nor indirectly disturb existing inter-
pretations of that word as used in federal statutes of limitations. More-
154. 414 U.S. at 557-58; Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 426-27, 427 n.2 (1965). 
155. The purposes of the proposal are to give sufficient warning to plaintiffs and to protect 
them from loss of claims due to purely technical defects. Displacement of all o!Jler commence-
ment rules is not necessary. 
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over, the time of commencement is significant in determining the 
existence of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, in determining resi.., 
dence for venue purposes, in setting a beginning point for periods es-
tablished in other of the Rules, and in determining priority between 
concurrent actions. 156 
2. A statute of limitations shall not he deemed a bar for failure to bring 
an action in a timely fashion 
The proposed amendment states only an affirmative proposition-
that if the following condition is satisfied, a statute of limitations will 
not bar an action. The amendment does not state the negative proposi-
tion that in order to satisfy any statute of limitations the following con-
dition must be satisfied. 157 If the applicable law requires only filing, 
the plaintiff can simply satisfy that requirement. 
3. . .. !(,within the period allowed hy the applicable law for service of 
process, . .. 
The amendment is to provide a method by which plaintiff can sat-
isfy any applicable statute of limitations. It would apply even when a 
state commencement provision required issuance of summons but not 
service within the limitations period. That state would necessarily "al-
low" service at a later time, and the failure of plaintiff to obtain issu-
ance of summons would not be significant----()nly his failure to give 
notice within the period allowed for service. Nothing in the Rule 
would restrict a federal court from exercising its inherent power to clear 
the docket of cases for want of prosecution should inordinate delay be 
caused. The period is not described as the "limitations" period because 
that description could be interpreted to exclude those periods in addi-
tion to the limitations period in which service may be completed. 158 
4. . . . the defendant has instead received such notice of the filing of the 
complaint that he will not he prejudiced in maintaining his difense on the 
merits. 
Informal notice received by the defendant would be allowed as an 
alternative method for complying with statutes of limitations. Notice 
need only be received by defendant, not necessarily transmitted by 
156. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 55, § 1051, at 165-66. 
157. This approach is taken from the analysis applied by Judge Keeton in Covel v. Safetech, 
Inc., 90 F.R.D. 427, 432-33 (D. Mass. 1981) to determine that Rule 15(c), providing for relation 
back of amendments, did not prohibit the allowance of relation back under a more liberal state 
rule in a diversity case. 
158. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 97 (1971) (allowing completion of service within 60 days 
after filing if filing and an "attempt" to serve occur within the limitations period). Compare In-
gram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566, 571-72 (2d Cir. 1978) (the "period provided by law for commencing 
the action" language of Federal Rule 15(c) includes the time after the limitations period in which 
service is allowed) with Simmons v. Fenton, 480 F.2d 133, 136-37 (7th Cir. 1973) (Rule 15(c) 
requires notice within the limitations period). See also Note, supra note 139, at 105-06. 
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plaintiff. The information received by defendant must, however, be in 
regard to the filing of the complaint; notice of the existence of a claim 
and the likelihood of a lawsuit is not sufficient. If this latter type of 
notice was allowed, the defendant's right to determine with certainty 
the end of his liability would be affected; and, thus, the substantive 
right to breathe easy, engendered by a service requirement, would be 
modified or abridged. A court might be prompted, by concentrating 
solely on "notice of filing," to require particularized information be-
yond what was necessary to inform defendant of the institution of the 
suit and the nature of the claim, but the subsequent language is in-
cluded to control the court's consideration of the nature of the informa-
tion received. By requiring notice that is sufficient to prevent prejudice 
to defendant's efforts to defend himself, one of the identified purposes 
of a statute of limitations is promoted. The requirement of notice also 
promotes the primary purpose of such a statute-fairness to defend-
ant-in that he is assured of notice of suit, albeit informal, within the 
period allowed for service of process. 
B. Commentary on the Proposed Rule 
Rule 3, with the proposed amendment, would alert a plaintiff to 
the possibility that action beyond filing is required and would cause 
him to investigate further to discover the applicable law. The difficulty 
in determining whether the applicable state law required service would 
still exist, but through a quick reading of the Rule the plaintiff would 
know that complete safety could be achieved by filing the complaint 
and giving informal notice to the defendant within the limitations pe-
riod. Misinterpretation of the "period allowed by law"language would 
most likely lead to the conclusion that it referred to the limitations pe-
riod alone. Finding the applicable limitations provision would be less 
difficult than finding the applicable commencement provision and ac-
tion on the basis of this misinterpretation would protect, not harm, the 
plaintiff. 
The "notice" language of the proposal is taken largely from Rule 
15(c)(l) of the Federal Rules. Rule IS( c) deals with the relation back 
of amendments that change the party against whom a claim is asserted 
and is carefully designed to bring about the fair adjudication of rights 
and obligations without disturbing the substantive rights of defend-
ants. 159 It has been held valid and applicable in diversity cases even in 
159. See text of Rule 15(c), FED. R. Crv. P., supra note 138. For example, if plainillf incor-
rectly names a particular person as the defendant and then after the limitations period has expired 
seeks to correct his error by naming the real defendant in an amended complaint, the amendment-
added defendant will not be able to successfully assert the limitations defense if the conditions of 
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the face of more restrictive state rules. 160 
As the law presently exists, a defendant added by an amendment 
after the limitations period could not successfully assert a limitations 
defense if he had received sufficient informal notice within that pe-
riod. 161 This would be the result even if state law required service of 
process within the limitations period as to originally-named defend-
ants}62 The effect of Rule 15(c), therefore, is to deprive the amend-
ment-added defendant of his state right to service of process within 
the limitations period while preserving his right to receive information 
within the period sufficient to alert him to the need for preserving his 
defensive evidence and, of course, sufficient to inform him that he had 
been sued. Had this defendant been named in the original complaint 
but not given service of process within the required period, he would be 
allowed to interpose his limitations defense even though, within that 
period, he had full knowledge of the filing of the complaint such that 
he would not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense. 163 
The Supreme Court did not consider the significance of informal 
notice in Walker but it did state that the case was indistinguishable 
Rule 15(c) are satisfied. Under these circumstances the amendment is said to relate back to the 
date of the original pleading in that the action stated in the amendment will be deemed to have 
been commenced when the action was initially instituted. Because the effect of Rule 15(c) is to 
deny a limitations defense to this added defendant, relation back is allowed only when the policies 
of a statute of limitations are served-when that defendant receives sufficient and timely notice of 
the original action knowing that but for a mistake he would have been named. To do otherwise, as 
the Advisory Committee's notes to the 1966 amendment to Rule 15(c) state, would be to "defeat 
unjustly the claimant's opportunity to prove his case." 39 F.R.D. 69, 83 (1966) (advisory commit-
tee notes); see Western & Lehman, supra note 113, at 363-64. 
160. See, e.g., Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 615 F.2d 606, 612 (4th Cir. 1980), cert dismissed, 
448 U.S. 911 (1980); Britt v. Arvanitis, 590 F.2d 57, ~61 (3d Cir. 1978); Ingram v. Kumar, 585 
F.2d 566, 570 n.S (2d Cir. 1978), em. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979); Simmons v. Fenton, 480 F .2d 
133, 136 (7th Cir. 1973); Welch v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 466 F.2d 1344, 1345 (5th Cir. 
1972). See generally 380 U.S. at 473. 
161. The notice received by the added defendant need not be formally transmitted. 39 F.R.D. 
69, 82-3 (1966) (advisory committee notes); Haworth, Cllanging Defmdanls in Pri11ate CMJ Actions 
under Federal Rule J.J(c)-An Ancient Problem Lingers On, 1975 Wts. L. REv. 552, 572. Some 
commentators have discussed "informality" without clearly distinguishing between the means of 
giving or acquiring information and the nature of the information received, that is, whether de-
fendant knew of a particular lawsuit or only of the likelihood of future filing. See 6 C. WRIOHT & 
A. MILLER, supra note 55,§ 1498, at 507-11; Note, supra note 139, at 96-100. 
If the notice required under Rule 15(c)(l) must be transmitted formally, that is, through serv-
ice of process on the added defendant, the rule would have no remedial effect whatsoever. Rule 
15(c) would, under these circumstances, have the effect of imposing the more onerous burden of 
service of process even when not required as to an original defendant. This was clearly not meant 
to be the purpose of this provision. See 39 F.R.D. 69, 82-83 (1966) (advisory committee notes). 
162. q: Note, supra note 139, at 126-27. 
163. In this case neither Rule 3 (because of Walker) nor Rule 15(c) (because by its terms it 
applies only to defendants added by amendment) would apply. 
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from Ragan. 164 In the court of appeals opinion in Ragan, 165 it is noted 
the plaintiff had not only filed his complaint within the two-year state 
limitations period but had also within that period secured service on 
one Clarence M. Trent in the offices of the defendant. This service was 
quashed, however, because the marshall in serving Trent, who was not 
an officer or registered agent of the corporation, had failed to exercise 
due diligence in ascertaining whether officers of the corporation could 
be found before he left the summons at the offices of the corporation. 
Since an alias summons was served after the period in which service 
was required, the court held the state statute of limitations barred 
plaintiffs action. 166 This decision was upheld by the Supreme 
Court. 167 As a consequence, a plaintiff who investigated his case to find 
out who the proper defendant was and where it was located suffered 
the loss of his claim because of the lack of diligence of the marshall, not 
because of his own lack of diligence in seeking service of process. It 
seems certain that Merchants Transfer & Warehouse company did re-
ceive actual notice within the limitations period but was allowed to es-
cape liability by virtue of a pure technicality. 168 
The proposed amendment would prevent this unfair result and 
also make more consistent the treatment of original and amendment-
added defendants. 169 A plaintiff would also be less vulnerable to mys-
terious state laws, elusive defendants, and less than adequate process-
servers since he could take quick action on his own to preserve his 
claim by filing the complaint and then, perhaps, placing a telephone 
call to the defendant or his attorney. Assuming an attorney has been 
representing the defendant's interests in regard to that claim, he would 
be the person in the best position to take action to preserve defensive 
evidence and could be relied on to notify defendant of this develop-
ment. Notice provided the attorney of a defendant added by an 
amendment has been ini.puted to that defendant to satisfy Rule 15(c) 
164. Walker, 466 U.S. at 748. 
165. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co. v. Ragan, 170 F.2d 987 (lOth Cir. 1948). 
166. Id at 992-93. 
167. 337 U.S. at 534. 
168. The original summons was served on September 22, 1945, and the statute of limitations 
expired on October I, 1945. The company filed its motion to quash this summons on October 12, 
1945. See 170 F.2d at 989. 
169. Inconsistency that would not be corrected arises in those jurisdictions in which filing is 
alone sufficient to commence an action for limitations purposes. Here, because Rule 15(c) re-
quires notice be received within the period for "commencing the action," an amendment-added 
defendant has to receive notice within the limitations period while notice to an originally-named 
defendant can be received after that period. See 585 F.2d at 571. The suggestion of some com-
mentators is to amend Rule 15(c) so that notice is sufficient if received within the period allowed 
for service of process. See Haworth, supra note 161, at 564; Note, supra note 139, at 133. 
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and therefore avoid a limitations bar. 170 
Service of process is, of course, the act by which a court asserts its 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the interests of the defendant. Aside from 
questions of amenability to service, the Due Process Clause requires, as 
a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction, sufficient notice to defend-
ant so that he will have a meaningful opportunity to appear and defend 
himself. 171 The notice required to satisfy due process is that which is 
reasonably certain to inform the defendant of the pendency of the ac-
tion.172 For purposes of assuring due process, some adequate form of 
service is, of course, ultimately required, but the purposes served 
thereby are different from the purposes served by a statute of limita-
tions. Actual notice within the limitations period provides the defend-
ant sufficient information to alert him to the fact of suit and the need to 
preserve evidence while formal service of process required at some later 
point but before adjudication of the defendant's interests assures him of 
a meaningful opportunity to appear and defend himself. 173 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As I review this article I cannot put aside the concern that some-
thing more should be said to clarify, explain, or persuade. When, how-
ever, I look back to the twelve lonely words presently contained in the 
object of all this, it seems perhaps enough has been said. My perora-
tion is therefore brief. 
Nothing beyond inertia appears to justify continuing the trap in-
herent in the present existence of Rule 3. This Rule should be changed 
so that it, like the other Rules, may be construed to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action on the merits. 
170. See Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404, 407-08 (5th Cir. 1980); Montalvo v. Tower Life 
Bldg., 426 F.2d 1135, 1147 (5th Cir. 1970); Snodgrass v. Roberts Dairy Co., 82 F .R.D. 626, 631-32 
(D. Neb. 1979); Washington v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 324 F. Supp. 849, 853 (W.O. La. 1971). 
17L Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
172. Id 
173. The issues also arise at different times and, when decided, have different consequences 
for the defendant. Due process notice questions are most often critical when a judgment has been 
entered against a defendant who has not appeared. Such rights can be asserted long after the 
judgment has been entered and often even in a different jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, 
proof of actual notice could be exceedingly difficult. Moreover, a decision on this issue may estab-
lish the ultimate liability of the defendant. Assertion of a limitations defense, on the other hand, 
must be part of the process of adjudicating the merits, more contemporaneous with the acts alleg-
edly establishing notice, and the decision on that defense, though important, cannot establish the 
defendant's liability on the merits. There is, therefore, a distinct need for protecting the defend-
ant's due process right to appear by requiring formal service of process since that procedure pro-
vides evidence of notice for the record. 
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APPENDIX 
The following are reported decisions by federal courts in which 
one matter considered was the role of Rule 3 in regard to a statute of 
limitations. The decisions are broadly divided into cases based on di-
versity of citizenship jurisdiction and those brought on other bases of 
federal subject matter jurisdiction. Special attention was given diver-
sity jurisdiction because considerations of federalism are to a greater 
' degree implicated in such cases and because this division facilitated 
research. 
SUMMARY 
I. Decisions in cases based on diversity of citizenship 
jurisdiction. 102 
A. From the effective date of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to the date of the decision in Ragan v. 
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 
(1949). 
[September 16, 1938 to June 20, 1949] 11 
B. From the date of the Ragan decision to the date of the 
decision in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
[June 20, 1949 to April 26, 1965] 38 
c. From the date of the Hanna decision to the date of the 
decision in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 
(1980). 
[April 26, 1965 to June 2, 1980] 46 
D. From the date of the Walker decision to the date of the 
last decision discovered. 
[June 2, 1980 to June 5, 1981] 7 
II. Decisions in cases brought on other bases of federal 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
[1938 through 1980] I 100 
TOTAL 202 
CASES 
I. Decisions in cases based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. 
A. From the effective date of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure to the date of the decision in Ragan v. Merchants Trans-
fer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949). 
[September 16, 1938 to June 20, 1949] 
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1. Courts of Appeals 
Zuckerman v. McCulley, 170 F.2d 1015, 1018 (8th Cir. 
1948). 
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co. v. Ragan, 170 F.2d 
987, 991-92 (lOth Cir. 1948). 
Isaacks v. Jeffers, 144 F.2d 26, 28 (lOth Cir. 1944). 
Hackner v. Guar. Trust Co., 117 F.2d 95, 98-99 (2d Cir. 
1941). 
2. District Courts 
Stauffer v. McLain Trucking, Inc., 8 F.R.D. 478, 478-79 
(N.D. Ohio 1948). 
Blum v. Postal Tel, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 237, 238 (W.D. Pa. 
1945). 
Yudin v. Carroll, 57 F. Supp. 793, 798-99 (W.D. Ark. 
1944). 
International Pulp Equip. Co. v. St. Regis Kraft Co., 55 F. 
Supp. 860, 861 (D. Del. 1944). 
Mealy v. Fidelity Nat1 Bank, 2 F.R.D. 339, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 
1942). 
Cannon v. Time, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 660, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 
1939). 
Gallagher v. Carroll, 27 F. Supp. 568, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 
1939). 
B. From the date of the Ragan decision to the date of the 
decision in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
[June 20, 1949 to April 26, 1965] 
1. Courts of Appeals 
Chicago, RI. & P. RR v. Stude, 204 F.2d 954, 956 (8th 
Cir. 1953). 
Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F.2d 949, 951-52 (2d 
Cir. 1950). 
2. District Courts 
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Taylor, 239 F. Supp. 
913, 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
Callan v. Lillybelle, Ltd, 234 F. Supp. 773, 776-77 (D.N.J. 
1964), citing with approval Ackerley v. Commercial Credit 
Co., 111 F. Supp. 92, 95-96 (D.N.J. 1953). 
Harrison v. Kovats, 224 F. Supp. 581, 583 (W.D.S.C. 
1963). 
Wm. T. Burton, Inc. v. Reed Roller Bit Co., 214 F. Supp. 
84, 86 (W.D. La. 1963). 
Rios v. Drennan, 209 F. Supp. 927, 928 (E.D.N.C. 1962). 
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Mahan v. Ohio Auto Rentals Co. , 207 F. Supp. 383, 384 
(S.D. Ohio 1962). 
Netermyer v. Henley, 205 F. Supp. 734, 735-36 (N.D. Ind. 
1962). 
Jozwiak v. Dayton Oil Co., 200 F. Supp. 300, 302 
(S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
Westerman v. Grow, 198 F. Supp. 309, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 
1961). 
Norwoodv. Lineherger-Bergen, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 127, 129 
(W.D.N.C. 1961). 
Burkhardt v. Bates, 191 F. Supp. 149, 151 (N.D. Iowa 
1961). 
Skilling v. Funk Aircraft Co., 173 F. Supp. 939, 943 (W.D. 
Mo. 1959). 
Johansson v. Towson, 177 F. Supp. 729,732 (D. Ga. 1959). 
L. G. Difelice & Son, Inc. v. Globe Indemnity Co. , 23 
F.R.D. 275, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
Kie.!fer v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co., 167 F. Supp. 398,401 (D. 
Md. 1958). 
Jack v. Travelers Ins. Co., 22 F.R.D. 318,319 (E.D. Mich. 
1958). 
Lorraine Motors, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 166 F. 
Supp. 319, 323 (E.D.N.Y. 1958). 
Decker v. Boyle, 162 F. Supp. 164, 166 (W.D.N.Y. 1957). 
Hagy v. Allen, 153 F. Supp. 302, 304-05 (E.D. Ky. 1957). 
Hixon v. Highsmith, 147 F. Supp. 801,802-03 (E.D. Tenn. 
1957). 
Cahill v. St. Mary's Hosp., 20 F.R.D. 103, 104 (E.D.N.Y. 
1956). 
Wagner v. New York, Ont. & W. Ry., 146 F. Supp. 926, 
928-29 & n.2 (M.D. Pa. 1956). 
General Elec. Co. v. Central Transit Warehouse Co., 127 F. 
Supp. 817, 824 (W.D. Mo. 1955). 
Reisinger v. Cannon, 127 F. Supp. 50, 51 (D. Conn. 1954). 
Lanigan v. Boston Terminal Corp., 112 F. Supp. 957, 957 
(D. Mass. 1953). 
Ackerley v. Commercial Credit Co., Ill F. Supp. 92, 95-96 
(D.N.J. 1953). 
Macri v. Flaherty, 115 F. Supp. 739, 743 (E.D.S.C. 1953). 
West v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T.P. Ry., 108 F. Supp. 276, 278 
(E.D. Tenn. 1952). 
Myers v. Slotkin, 13 F.R.D. 191, 192 (E.D.N.Y. 1952). 
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Rogers v. Halford, 101 F. Supp. 295, 296 (E.D. Wis. 1952). 
Glebus v. Filmore, 104 F. Supp. 902,903 (D. Conn. 1952). 
Burns v. Chubb, 99 F. Supp. 581, 582 (E.D. Pa. 1951). 
Masterpiece Prod, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 90 F. Supp. 
150, 151 (E.D. Pa. 1950). 
McCarley v. Foster-Milburn, 89 F. Supp. 643, 645 
(W.D.N.Y. 1950). 
Otto v. Hirl, 89 F. Supp. 72, 74 (S.D. Iowa 1950). 
Nola Elec. Co. v. Reilly, 93 F. Supp. 164, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 
1948). 
C. From the date of the Hanna decision to the date of the 
decision in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
[April 26, 1965 to June 2, 1980] 
1. Courts of Appeals 
Rose v. K.K. Masutoku Toy Factory Co., 597 F.2d 215, 
217-18 (lOth Cir. 1979). 
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 592 F.2d 1133, 1135 (lOth 
Cir. 1979). 
Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 592 F.2d 1118, 1122 
(lOth Cir. 1979). 
Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 554 F.2d 1165, 
1167-68 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
Smith v. Peters, 482 F.2d 799, 800-01 (6th Cir. 1973). 
Prashar v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 480 F.2d 947, 949-53 
(8th Cir. 1973). 
Chappell v. Rouch, 448 F.2d 446, 447-48 (lOth Cir. 1971). 
Anderson v. Papillion, 445 F.2d 841, 842 (5th Cir. 1971). 
Sylvestri v. Warner cf Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598, 604 (2d 
Cir. 1968). . 
Groninger v. Davison, 364 F.2d 638, 639-40 (8th Cir. 
1966). 
2. District Courts 
Scharjfv. Cameron Offshore Serv., Inc., 475 F. Supp. 48, 
50-51 (W.D. La. 1979). 
Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1093 
(N.D.N.Y. 1977). 
Cannon v. Metcalfe, 458 F. Supp. 843, 846-47 (E.D. Tenn. 
1977). 
Manatee Cablevision Corp. v. Pierson, 433 F. Supp. 571, 
516 (D.D.C. 1977). 
Chladek v. Sterns Transp. Co., 427 F. Supp. 270, 273 (E.D. 
Pa. 1977). 
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Sherwood v. Graco, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 155, 156-57 (D. 
Colo. 1977). 
Bartholomeo v. Parent, 71 F.R.D. 86, 87 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). 
Schinker v. Ruud Mfg. Co., 386 F. Supp. 626, 632-33 
(N.D. Iowa 1974). 
Leathers v. Serre//, 376 F. Supp. 983, 984 n.1 (W.O. Va. 
1974). 
Zarcone v. Condie, 62 F.R.D. 563, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
j . 
Benn v. Linden Crane Co., 370 F. Supp. 1269, 1279 (E.D. 
Pa. 1973). 
Litts v. Refrigerated Transp. Co., 375 F. Supp. 675, 676 
(M.D. Pa. 1973). 
Bratel v. Kutsher's Country Club, 61 F.R.D. 501, 502 
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
Krout v. Bridges, 58 F.R.D. 560, 561 (N.D. Iowa 1973). 
Janus v. J.M. Barbe Co., 57 F.R.D. 539, 541 (N.D. Ohio 
1972). 
Prashar v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesel/schafl, 341 F. 
Supp. 129, 130 (D.S.D. 1972). 
Meredith v. Glamorene Prod Corp., 55 F.R.D. 397, 399 
(E.D. Wis. 1972). 
Tanner v. Presidents-First Lady Spa, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 
950, 953, 958-61 (E.D. Mo. 1972). 
McCrea v. General Motors Corp. , 53 F.R.D. 384, 385 (D. 
Mont. 1971). 
Alford v. Whitsel, 52 F.R.D. 327, 329 (N.D. Miss. 1971). 
Smith v. Seaboard Coast Line RR, 327 F. Supp. 536, 539 
(D.S.C. 1971). 
Anderson v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 320 F. Supp. 399, 401 (W.O. 
La. 1970). 
Gatliffv. Little Audrey's Transp. Co., 317 F. Supp. 1117, 
1119 (D. Neb. 1970). 
Worldwide Carriers Ltd v. Aris S.S. Co., 312 F. Supp. 
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